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Abstract
The demand for high-speed Internet access is escalating high sales of ADSL routers. In-turn this has prompted
individuals to attack and exploit the vulnerabilities in these devices. To respond to these threats, methods of
acquisition and analysis are needed. The configuration data provides a wealth of information into the current
state of the device. Hence, this data may be used to identify and interpret unlawful ways in which the device was
used. This paper is centres around an empirical learning approach identifying techniques to address the
device’s acquirable limitations taking into consideration that the owner may not willingly present login
credentials to directly access the device. This paper demonstrates a procedural method of obtaining data of
interest from ADSL routers. It further elaborates on the methods by detailing how to extract and understand this
configuration data.
Keywords
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INTRODUCTION
The demand for Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) devices has increased considerably as consumers
are offered fast and inexpensive methods to connect to the Internet. The plug and play nature of ADSL routers
permits consumers to bypass the tedious configuration process and connect to the Internet in a streamlined
manner. Numerous Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are shipping ADSL routers pre-configured with the client’s
username and password further eliminating the difficulties faced by novice computer users to access the Internet.
Conversely, these pre-configured ADSL routers usually incorporate little or no security. As a result many Small
office Home office (SoHo) ADSL routers are vulnerable to a range of emerging threats, exploiting these insecure
aspects.
The number of threats to ADSL has increased significantly over the past few years. In addition the threats are
sophisticated and well planned. Sajdak (2009) outlines the vulnerabilities associated with the flawed design of
ADSL routers. One of these flaws permits Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks to take place. CSRF
attacks target the ADSL router’s flawed web server design. This attack succeeds since the Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP) service places an automatic element of trust on internal hosts that attempt to access the web
management function. As a result any attack originating from within the internal network would execute with
root (or administrator) access.
The threats to ADSL routers are not limited to attacks from within the internal network. The default firmware of
many first generation Netcomm routers initially encompassed a web server flaw which permitted the device to
be accessed, compromised and controlled via a host external to the network (Sajdak, 2009). Whilst these
vulnerabilities are exploiting the web server design, there are still many threats to ADSL routers that do not
directly relate to the flawed web server.
In the first quarter of 2009 a new form of malware had been detected which was specifically targeting MIPS
architecture - Linux based, ADSL routers. An ADSL Router based malware - Psyb0t was hijacking consumergrade networking devices with the intention of creating a sophisticated and un-detectable botnet (Baume, 2009;
Hunt, 2009; Magnus & Gassmann, 2009; Paul, 2009). The malware was capable of infecting approximately 55
different consumer grade ADSL routers in its early stages (Sajdak, 2009). In addition, the malicious binary is
pre-populated with a list of 6,000 usernames and 13,000 passwords combinations commonly used on many
ADSL routers – giving it a higher likelihood of compromising a vulnerable device. The malware once executed
successfully resides in volatile memory. It then continually manipulates the configuration data to permit the
botnet controller to communicate with the compromised device. To date evidence exists demonstrating the
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effects that this particular malware has had on third party web servers which have been shut down due to denial
of service attacks by ADSL routers.
To date there are few protection methods that exist to prevent an ADSL router from being compromised. There
is yet to be a release of an anti-malware product for ADSL routers. A simple solution includes changing the
default login credentials on the device. Psyb0t cleverly exploits human-error by compromising those devices
which did not have their default credentials modified. Alternatively, consumers may upgrade the firmware of
their ADSL router on a regular and timely basis. However, as previous research has identified (Szewczyk &
Furnell, 2009) in many instances applying a remedy is still a challenging task in that many individuals lack the
skill set to appropriately download, install and apply a firmware update. This issue will remain complex until the
process of firmware updating is streamlined in a similar method to the Microsoft Windows update process.

DIGITAL FORENSICS
Configuration data in ADSL routers is stored in two different memory components. ADSL routers encompass
persistent storage, namely Non Volatile Random Access Memory (NVRAM). Data contained within the
NVRAM remains intact during a power cycle or shutdown. In-turn this permits the end-user to store persistent
configuration data such as wireless encryption keys. During the boot procedure the kernel creates a temporary
storage space in Random Access Memory (RAM) which appears to the end-user and the embedded system as an
extended flash storage medium. However, any changes which occur on the embedded system which are not
committed to NVRAM or are stored in the temporary storage will be erased when a loss of power occurs.
From a forensic perspective the memory modules within the embedded system may be analysed and acquired
utilising embedded system forensic methods (Breeuwsma, Jongh, Klaver, Knijff, & Roeloffs, 2007). The
configuration data of an ADSL router contains a wealth of information which may aid in a legal case. Unlike a
computer system or smart phone, there is little capacity within the device for the storage of illegal images,
documents or multimedia files. The device does however control the flow of traffic within the network and as a
result may aid in determining if a suspect has in fact accessed resources or websites of an illegal or malicious
nature. Brown (2006) suggests that based on the threats currently targeting ADSL routers that the most important
data to be acquired from an ADSL router consists of:
x

Firmware version – This aids in determining if the device in question is utilising an illegal or
maliciously altered operating system.

x

System time – The ADSL router stores a simple yet effective log of significant system modifications.
This may enable the forensic examiner to create a timeline of events which initiated or caused the crime
to take place.

x

DNS address – Acquiring the DNS address may in-turn allow the investigator to determine if any
redirection of traffic is occurring.

x

Wireless settings – Bandwidth theft is escalating due to insecure wireless access points. Acquiring the
Medium Access Control (MAC) allow and deny lists, encryption keys, and determining if the access
point is enabled may allow the forensic examiner to construct a scenario of events to do with the
wireless network.

x

Firewall rule sets – The ADSL router is pre-enabled with a set of firewall rule sets. Acquiring the
current rules in place may aid in identifying how vulnerable the device in question was during an
incident.

x

Remote management – Many attacks attempt to enable remote management to simplify the controlling
process. Acquiring remote management settings may aid the investigator in identifying to whom the
permission has been enabled.
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ACQUISITION OF POTENTIAL EVIDENCE
Breeuwsma (2006) details how the JTAG approach is feasible in acquiring data from ADSL routers. One of the
most beneficial aspects is its small memory footprint and the absence of required login credentials. However, the
JTAG approach is comparatively slow compared to the methods described in this paper. Furthermore, it does not
immediately grant the investigator with data that could be analysed and used immediately. The procedure
covered in this paper considers the benefits of the JTAG approach whilst demonstrating how configuration data
could be acquired.
ADSL routers by default encompass few (if any) access ports – making it challenging to readily acquire data in a
forensically sound manner. In addition the device is manufactured with soldered on-board memory components
which are not only difficult to remove, but may also result in device malfunction due to improper handling. As a
result investigating the device in a non-invasive manner is not always feasible. In “ADSL Router Forensics:
Methods of Acquisition”, Szewczyk (2009) details and compares the methods by which data could be acquired
from ADSL routers to ensure little or no modification of the ADSL router state. These methods are practically
applied within the procedure, through the use of a telnet or serial console approach.
ADSL routers operate through the use of partitions on flash memory. During boot time a file system is created
which mimics that of a Linux based system. In typical ADSL router configurations there are four partitions
consisting of; mtd0, which is a compressed CRAMFS or SQUASHFS file system image; mtd1, the MIPS Linux
kernel; mtd2, the boot loader and; mtd3, the boot loader variables and configuration data (AR7 Firmware, 2009).
The mtd3 block of data is of most use to an investigator. During boot time the configuration data is prepopulated into the ADSL router permitting the device to function in the same manner during each reboot. The
aim of this procedure is the actual extraction of either the config.xml file or the binary data contained in
/dev/mtdblock/3 which encompass the configuration data for each device.
Accessing the ADSL Router
1) Accessing the device may be achieved in two distinct approaches dependant on whether or not the login
credentials are available to the investigator.
a)

In the instance of a co-operative client and having access to login credentials an investigator may
directly access the device utilising a telnet client through the IP addresses allocated to the ADSL router
in question. In this circumstance the investigator requires both the username and password.

Figure 2 Utilising PuTTY through Telnet
b) In the event of an ADSL router requiring login credentials which were unknown, the investigator may
still access the device through the serial console bypassing the authentication method. The serial
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console approach does not require credentials thus preventing a potential halt of the device through
exceeding the number of login attempts.
In order for the serial console approach to operate three requirements must be met; access to the internal
board within the ADSL router, which requires the removal of the outer case; identifying and locating
the serial console pins; and, a specially designed cable which permits a connection between the
workstation and the serial console ports on the ADSL router (Szewczyk, 2009). The serial client
(PuTTy) must be configured to communicate with the ADSL router. ADSL router serial console
settings include; 38,400 baud rate, no parity and flow control, eight (8) data bits and one (1) stop bit.
2) The HTTP daemon must be terminated as this service is required to obtain data in subsequent steps. This
serves two purposes. Firstly it prevents intentional or accidental modification of configuration data through
the web interface. Secondly, the HTTP services will be subsequently used to acquire the data of interest off
the ADSL router. As demonstrated by Figure 2 the HTTP service in this experiment is distinguished by
Process ID 52 which is currently hosting the web management function for administration.

Figure 3 Default process list
Acquiring Data of Interest
3) There are two distinct configuration files which must be acquired from the ADSL router. The first
configuration file is in XML format and is located in /etc. The second data of interest element is located in
/dev/mtdblock/3. The config.xml file is made accessible through the following set of commands which setup
a new HTTP daemon with root privileges.
# cd /etc
# thttpd –g –d /etc –u root –p 81
4) The investigator must navigate a web browser to http://10.1.1.1:81 which will present a listing of files
currently contained in the /etc directory as demonstrated in Figure 3. The investigator may then simply save
the file to the desktop as if it were any other file located within a web page.
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Figure 4 Web browser access to configuration files
5) The second set of data to be acquired is the raw binary configuration file. The investigator must first
terminate the existing HTTP daemon as this will not be used to acquire the subsequent data. During ADSL
router boot time a small amount of RAM is set aside for the file system and user-accessible temporary
storage. The Linux utility dd encompassed within the ADSL router permits an exact byte copy of data stored
within flash memory. This data is automatically loaded and interpreted by the device’s kernel during boot
time and the data is used to create the default state of the router. The following command may be used to
acquire the data of interest and make it accessible via the web browser.
# kill 132
# cd /var/tmp
# dd if=/dev/mtdblock/3 of=mtd3-original.bin
# thttpd –g –d /var/tmp –u root –p 81
6) As per step three, the investigator utilises the web browser to view and acquire the binary configuration data
from flash memory. In this instance the file to be download is represented by mtd3-original.bin.
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Converting Data of Interest
7) In contrast to acquiring a readable config.xml file, the raw configuration data requires a conversion to be of
readable form. A utility exists for converting raw binary configuration data into a readable xml based file.
As demonstrated in Figure 4 the default raw-data file will not permit an immediate conversion. Through an
empirical learning approach it has been discovered that the first 10,240 bytes are not configuration data and
must be removed.

Figure 5 Error while converting raw configuration data
8) In order to effectively transform the raw binary data into a form recognised by the converter utility the first
10,240 bytes which are boot loader configuration variables must be removed. In the experiment
demonstrated in Figure 5 the total block size consists of 55,296 bytes.
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Figure 6 WinHex removal of boot loader configuration data
9) Having saved the new binary data file minus the first 10,240 bytes this now permits the configuration
program to effectively translate the raw data into a readable xml file.
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RESULTS
In order to determine the feasibility and forensic soundness of the acquisition a series of testing procedures were
undertaken. The tests aimed at discovering:
x The default state of configuration data after it has been acquired.
x The state of acquired configuration data after a reboot had been performed.
x The state of acquired and ADSL router configuration data after a manual change was applied.
One of the limiting factors of acquiring data from ADSL routers is the fact that there is no cryptographic hashing
software available on the device by default to check the integrity of the data before and after an acquisition has
occurred. As a result this limits the soundness of the acquisition and instead relies on the precision of the method
followed. To validate the integrity of the data an alternative approach had been taken.
x The ADSL router was reset to known default state.
x The config.xml file was acquired (Acquisition #1).
x The ADSL router was rebooted and a subsequent acquisition taken (Acquisition #2)
x Firewall rule sets and wireless settings were modified on the ADSL router and an acquisition was
conducted (Acquisition #3).
x The same firewall rule sets and wireless settings were modified to the data of Acquisition #1 and an
MD5 digest generated.
Table 3 Comparison of acquisition cryptographic hash digests
Data
MD5 Digest
config.xml (1st acquisition)
f6ccb1d8700281cd1f9afe368675bf90
config.xml (2nd acquisition)
f6ccb1d8700281cd1f9afe368675bf90
config.xml (modified on ADSL router)
0f26bb398fdbc1269232ebd4ce2bc780
config.xml (modified on workstation)
0f26bb398fdbc1269232ebd4ce2bc780
As demonstrated by Table 1 acquiring the configuration data after the device has been switched off and rebooted
still results in the same md5 digest in both instances. Thus this shows that when acquiring configuration data the
device can be switched of and examined at a remote location. Secondly, if a configuration change occurs on the
ADSL router and the same manipulation of variables occurs by editing the original configuration data the same
unique md5 digest will also be identified.

DISCUSSION
Interpreting the data acquired from the ADSL routers in question is not a trivial task. As it stands there is no
elegant manner by which to interpret the data to identify key configuration data sets. Configuration data in
ADSL routers function on a principle of utilising states to determine if the service or rule set is enabled and/or
functioning. While examining the configuration data – Telnet by default is enabled on the majority of ADSL
routers. In-turn the state of the service is given a numerical representation of 1. Alternatively, services inclusive
of TFTP or SSH are by default disabled. As a result these services in the configuration data are represented by a
numerical value of 0 signifying an off or disabled trait.
Utilising the acquisition method and interpreting the data and enabled services may allow the investigator to
identify vulnerabilities and/or weaknesses that the device may have been susceptible to. The methods of
acquisition described throughout the paper have been used to acquire data of interest from devices purchased on
second hand auction sites throughout the Internet. Whilst the analysis of remnant data from ADSL routers still
remains in its infancy the approach is beginning to prove and show signs of practicability. In addition, current
acquisitions and analyses are demonstrating how consumers are utilising their broadband connection.
In 2009 a series of SoHo based ADSL routers were purchased and acquired in the effort to identify if consumers
are in fact removing their identity and network configuration data from these devices. From the series of second
hand devices purchased – none of the devices had the Internet Service Provider’s account credentials removed.
Whilst logging into the ADSL router may initially hide the contents of these confidential items – an examination
of the configuration data can quite easily recover these credentials that were used to access the broadband
connection. In addition the credentials used to access a broadband connection may also be used to access and
modify ISP accounts.
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Items of interest include ways in which the devices are being used over the Internet. Whilst downloading of
media over the Internet is highly publicised as being illegal an examination of ADSL routers in question is
showing that many of the second-hand devices identified had in fact enabled port forwarding of BitTorrent based
rule sets. As a result it would be quite plausible to trace the device back to the original owner where further
investigations could take place.

CONCLUSION
The research in progress continually demonstrates the importance and feasibility of acquiring data of interest
from ADSL routers in a forensically sound manner. This paper has demonstrated two approaches by which data
can be acquired with or without the co-operation of the owner of the device in question. This further
demonstrates that an investigator can be granted unrestricted access to the configuration data on the device and
use this to further analyse and interpret how the device was utilised.
The paper has only demonstrated one aspect of the ADSL router forensic process which could take plan on the
device. Whilst other note worthy approaches do exist such as identifying if dynamic malicious processes are
occurring – it was the aim of this paper to acquire the configuration data as a wealth of information is contained
within these files alone. Future research will analyse the dynamic and volatile aspects of the forensics process
and attempt to identify the methods by which the ADSL router could be removed for the scene of the crime
whilst still maintaining data integrity.
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